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Circuit Judges. 
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 2 
 
Andrew P. Bell, Esq. (ARGUED) 
Michael A. Galpern, Esq. 
Locks Law Firm, LLC 
457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 500 
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
Hillary Richard, Esq. (ARGUED) 
MaryAnn Sung, Esq. 
Brune & Richard LLP 
One Battery Park Plaza, 34th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
 
Melissa A. Herbert, Esq. 
Robin H. Rome, Esq. 
Kristine V. Ryan, Esq. 
Nukk-Freeman & Cerra, P.C. 
26 Main Street, Suite 301 
Chatham, NJ 07928 
 Counsel for Appellee Prudential Insurance Co. 
of America 
 
Kimberly B. Martin, Esq. 
Scott B. Smith, Esq. (ARGUED) 
Bradley, Arant, Boult, Cummings LLP 
200 Clinton Avenue West, Suite 900 
Huntsville, AL 35801 
 
Edmund S. Sauer, Esq. 
Bradley, Arant, Boult, Cummings LLP 
1600 Division Street, Suite 700 
Nashville, TN 32703 
 
Diane A. Bettino, Esq. 
Kellie A. Lavery, Esq. 
Reed Smith LLP 
Princeton Forrestal Village 
136 Main Street, Suite 250 
Princeton, NJ 08540 
 Counsel for Appellees Qinetiq N.A. Operations, LLC, 
Qinetiq, N.A., Inc., & Westar Aerospace & Defense Group, 
Inc. 
 
 3 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
Putative class plaintiffs Alexander L. Menkes and 
Stephen Wolfe appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their 
complaint for failure to state a claim.  This appeal requires us 
to determine whether certain supplemental insurance 
coverage is governed by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.  
We conclude that in the circumstances presented here, it is, 
and that it cannot be unbundled from the plaintiffs’ broader 
employer-provided ERISA benefits plan.  We then must 
decide whether ERISA preempts the various state law claims 
that the plaintiffs asserted.  Concluding that it does, we will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal.  
 
I. 
 
 We take the following facts from the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, documents to which it referred and upon which it 
relied, and the plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, which 
we must accept as true for the purposes of a motion to 
dismiss.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  The plaintiffs were employed by defense 
contractor defendant Qinetiq
1
 to work on a military base in 
Kirkuk, Iraq in 2008.  As employees, the plaintiffs were 
automatically enrolled in Qinetiq’s Basic Long Term 
Disability, Basic Life, and Accidental Death and 
Dismemberment insurance policies (the “Basic Policies”).  It 
                                              
1
 The plaintiffs were variously employed by defendants 
Qinetiq North America Operations, LLC, Qinetiq North 
America, Inc., and Westar Aerospace & Defense Group, Inc., 
all of which share the same ownership.  The claims against all 
three of these defendants are the same, and the defendants 
defended this case collectively. 
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is undisputed that Qinetiq offered this insurance coverage 
pursuant to ERISA.  These policies were established pursuant 
to a single group contract with the Prudential Insurance 
Company of North America, and Qinetiq paid the premiums 
for each of these policies on behalf of its employees.   
 
 Both plaintiffs also purchased supplemental insurance 
coverage to augment their basic benefits.  Both purchased 
what the plaintiffs term “Supplemental Long Term 
Disability” (“Buy Up LTD”) coverage, and Menkes 
purchased “Supplemental Accidental Death & 
Dismemberment” (“Supplemental AD&D”) coverage 
(collectively, the “Supplemental Coverage”).2  The plaintiffs 
paid additional premiums out of their own funds for this 
Supplemental Coverage in return for enhanced benefits 
should they sustain a covered injury.   
 
 The Supplemental Coverage operated pursuant to the 
exact same benefit terms, rules, exclusions, and claim 
procedures as the Basic Policies.  These terms, rules, 
exclusions, and claim procedures for the Basic Policies and 
Supplemental Coverage were outlined in a single insurance 
booklet certificate (“Booklet”) and a single summary plan 
description (“SPD”) for each type of insurance.  That is, the 
terms, rules, exclusions, and claim procedures for Qinetiq’s 
long term disability policy, for example, were contained in a 
single Booklet and SPD; there were not separate Booklets and 
SPDs for the Basic Policy and Supplemental Coverage.  Each 
SPD explicitly stated that the insurance coverage was being 
provided “under your Employer’s ERISA plan(s).”  Appendix 
(“App.”) 553, 621.  Each Booklet stated that the plaintiffs’ 
coverage was governed by a single group contract between 
Qinetiq and Prudential, and that Qinetiq was the plan sponsor 
and administrator.  App. 552, 620.  Had Qinetiq chosen not to 
provide (or to terminate) the Basic Policies, its employees 
would not have been able to purchase (or continue) the 
Supplemental Coverage.  An employee seeking benefits 
under a given policy would file a single claim, not separate 
                                              
2
 The plaintiffs’ original complaint alleges that they also 
purchased Supplemental Term Life coverage, but they do not 
seek any relief related to this policy on appeal. 
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claims for Basic Policy benefits and Supplemental Coverage 
benefits. 
 
 As is relevant to this appeal, each Booklet informed 
the plaintiffs of the policies’ respective war exclusion 
policies.  The Long Term Disability Booklet provided that 
“[y]our plan does not cover a disability due to war, declared 
or undeclared, or any act of war.”  App. 531.  The Accidental 
Death and Dismemberment Booklet provided that loss is not 
covered if it results from “[w]ar, or any act of war.  ‘War’ 
means declared or undeclared war and includes resistance to 
armed aggression.”  App. 594.  These war exclusion clauses 
applied to both the Basic Policies and the Supplemental 
Coverage because, again, each type of coverage was 
governed by a single set of documents with a single set of 
rules and exclusions.   
 
 The plaintiffs were not otherwise uninsured for injuries 
they incurred on account of war or acts of war.  As part of its 
government contract, Qinetiq also obtained insurance for its 
employees as required by the Defense Base Act (“DBA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 1651.  DBA insurance provides coverage for war-
related injuries sustained by contract employees while serving 
at military bases abroad.  Qinetiq obtained this coverage not 
from Prudential, but from the Insurance Company of the State 
of Pennsylvania (“ICSP”). 
 
 Menkes filed a claim under his Long Term Disability 
policy for three injuries he received while in Iraq:  (1) a back 
injury, (2) a positive tuberculosis (“TB”) test, and (3) post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).  Prudential denied his 
claim for all three injuries.  It used the war exclusion 
provision to deny benefits only for his PTSD injury.  It 
declined to compensate him for his back injury because it 
determined that his injury did not sufficiently impair his 
ability to pursue his regular occupation.  It declined to 
compensate him for his claimed TB because he subsequently 
had a negative TB test and showed no signs of being affected 
by any TB symptoms.  Menkes filed only a single claim for 
benefits owed to him under his Long Term Disability policy 
— he does not allege that he filed one claim for benefits 
under the Basic Policy and another for benefits under the 
Supplemental Coverage.  Menkes filed another claim for 
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benefits under his DBA policy for these same injuries.  
Although ICSP and Qinetiq disputed the extent of his injuries, 
the parties ultimately agreed to settle that claim. 
 Wolfe does not allege that he suffered any injury or 
ever filed any claim for benefits under either one of the 
Prudential policies or the DBA policy. 
 
 The plaintiffs filed this action in the District of New 
Jersey on May 14, 2012.  In their original complaint, they 
alleged six counts, including:  (1) violation of the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1, et 
seq.; (2) violation of the Truth in Consumer Contract, 
Warranty, and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
56:12-1, et seq.; (3) breach of contract and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) 
intentional or negligent misrepresentation and/or omission; 
(5) punitive damages; and (6) alternatively, violation of the 
consumer fraud laws of various states.  They contended that 
Prudential fraudulently induced them to buy the Supplemental 
Coverage knowing that any claim they filed would likely be 
subject to the war exclusion clauses because their place of 
employment was in a war zone in Iraq, rendering the 
Supplemental Coverage effectively worthless.
3
  They 
additionally alleged that Prudential deliberately concealed a 
policy or practice of using the war exclusion clauses to deny 
benefits for any and all injuries suffered while stationed 
abroad.  The remedies the plaintiffs sought were limited to 
return of the premiums they paid and punitive damages.
4
 
 
 The District Court dismissed the suit in its entirety.  It 
held that the Supplemental Coverage was governed by 
                                              
3
 These same war exclusion clauses would have rendered the 
Basic Policies (for which defendant Qinetiq paid all of the 
premiums) worthless as well. 
4
 The plaintiffs brought this as a putative class action on 
behalf of all employees of Department of Defense contractors 
who worked in Iraq and/or Afghanistan from February 10, 
2006 through the present who purchased Supplemental 
Coverage with a war exclusion clause.  App. 39-40.  Menkes 
sought to represent an additional sub-class of employees who 
had sought and were denied benefits under the Supplemental 
Coverage.  App. 40. 
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ERISA and could not be unbundled from the Basic Policies.  
Viewing the Basic Policies and Supplemental Coverage as 
closely related component parts of a single plan, it held that 
all of the plaintiffs’ state law claims were expressly 
preempted by ERISA’s broad preemption clause, § 514(a), 
which provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State 
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  In the 
alternative, it held that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted 
by § 502(a) of ERISA because the causes of action that the 
plaintiffs asserted conflicted with ERISA’s exclusive civil 
enforcement scheme.  It also held that the DBA preempted 
Menkes’s state law claims.   
 
 The District Court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion 
for leave to amend their complaint as futile.  The plaintiffs 
submitted a proposed amended complaint in which they:  (1) 
deleted any reference to the New Jersey TCCWNA, (2) 
deleted all references to the term life insurance policies, and 
(3) added a state law breach of fiduciary duty claim.  The 
court addressed these proposed revisions in its opinion and 
held that the proposed amended complaint was substantially 
similar to the original.  The plaintiffs timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
Our review of the District Court’s grant of a motion to 
dismiss based on ERISA preemption is plenary.  Pryzbowski 
v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 268 (3d Cir. 2001).  
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  A complaint has facial 
plausibility when there is enough factual content “that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  A court must accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 
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inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).   
We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend 
for abuse of discretion.  Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 
223 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
III. 
 
 The plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred in 
concluding that their state law claims were preempted by 
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), which broadly 
preempts state laws that “relate to” an ERISA plan.  The 
plaintiffs argue that their claims are not preempted because:  
(1) the Supplemental Coverage is not a “plan” that was 
“established or maintained” by Qinetiq, and (2) the 
Supplemental Coverage is excluded from the scope of ERISA 
by virtue of a regulatory safe harbor.  We conclude that the 
first contention is without merit and that the Supplemental 
Coverage, as part of Qinetiq’s broader benefits plan, is 
governed by ERISA. 
 
A. 
 
 ERISA applies to “any employee benefit plan if it is 
established or maintained . . .  by any employer engaged in 
commerce.”  29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).  ERISA defines an 
employee welfare benefit plan as “any plan, fund, or program 
which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained 
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, 
to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established 
or is maintained for the purpose of providing [certain 
benefits] for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the 
purchase of insurance or otherwise.”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).  
An ERISA plan “‘is established if from the surrounding 
circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain [1] the 
intended benefits, [2] a class of beneficiaries, [3] the source 
of financing, and [4] procedures for receiving benefits.’”  
Shaver v. Siemens Corp., 670 F.3d 462, 475 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (en banc)).  The “crucial factor” in determining 
whether a “plan” has been established is “whether the 
employer has expressed an intention to provide benefits on a 
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regular and long-term basis.”  Gruber v. Hubbard Bert Karle 
Weber, Inc., 159 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 One of the touchstones of a plan that is governed by 
ERISA is the “establishment and maintenance of a separate 
and ongoing administrative scheme,” which the plan 
administrator must set up in order to determine eligibility for 
benefits.  Shaver, 670 F.3d at 476 (citing Angst v. Mack 
Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530, 1538 (3d Cir. 1992)).  This 
feature derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Fort 
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987), in 
which the Court held that ERISA preemption was designed 
“to afford employers the advantages of a uniform set of 
administrative procedures governed by a single set of 
regulations,” in situations where there exists an “ongoing 
administrative program to meet the employer’s obligation.”  
An administrative scheme “‘may arise where the employer, to 
determine the employee’s eligibility for and level of benefits, 
must analyze each employee’s particular circumstances in 
light of the [policy’s] criteria.’”  Shaver, 670 F.3d at 477 
(quoting Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 21 F.3d 
254, 257 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
 
 Given the circumstances outlined in the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, Qinetiq “established and maintained” the 
Supplemental Coverage within the meaning of ERISA.  It is 
undisputed that the Supplemental Coverage was governed by 
the same Booklets and SPDs as the Basic Policies.  These 
documents quite clearly outlined the intended benefits (see 
App. 512-13, 571-73, describing the amount and frequency of 
benefit payments), the class of beneficiaries (see App. 512, 
517-18, 575-76, describing who is eligible to become 
insured), the source of financing (see App. 513, 573, 
informing employees that Qinetiq paid all of the premiums 
for the basic Long Term Disability and basic Accidental 
Death and Dismemberment policies, but that employees must 
contribute to receive other coverage), and the procedures for 
receiving benefits (see App. 553-56, 621-24, detailing each 
policy’s “claim procedures”).   
 
 The portion of the SPDs that details “claim 
procedures” indicates that there existed a comprehensive 
administrative scheme for determining eligibility for benefits 
after an employee filed a claim.  The SPDs each promised 
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that Prudential would notify a claimant regarding a 
determination of eligibility for benefits within forty-five days 
of filing a claim.  The criteria for eligibility were exhaustively 
set out in the Booklets.  If a claim were denied, Prudential 
promised to inform the employee in writing of the specific 
reason for the denial, whether the denial could be cured, and 
the procedures for appealing the denial.  This administrative 
scheme clearly evidences Qinetiq’s “intention to provide 
benefits on a regular and long-term basis.”  Gruber, 159 F.3d 
at 789.  Qinetiq therefore “established and maintained” the 
Basic Policies and Supplemental Coverage, which operated as 
a single plan, within the meaning of ERISA. 
 
B. 
 
 Although the Basic Policies indisputably were 
governed by ERISA, the plaintiffs argue that the 
Supplemental Coverage ought to be “unbundled” and 
analyzed separately.  They contend that if the Supplemental 
Coverage is viewed separately, then the Supplemental 
Coverage is not a welfare benefit plan that is governed by 
ERISA because of a regulatory safe harbor that excludes 
certain “programs.”  See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j).  The 
plaintiffs, however, point to no authority that would suggest 
that closely related components of an overarching welfare 
benefit plan ought to be unbundled, and in the circumstances 
presented here, there are several compelling reasons not to do 
so. 
 
 All of the characteristics of the Basic Policies and 
Supplemental Coverage indicate that they are not two 
separate sources of coverage, but two parts of one broader 
benefits plan.  All of the Basic Policies and Supplemental 
Coverage were governed by a single group contract between 
Qinetiq and Prudential.  All of the information regarding 
benefit terms, rules, exclusions, and claim procedures for the 
Basic Policies and Supplemental Coverage were the same and 
contained in the same documents; Qinetiq did not issue 
separate Booklets and SPDs for the Supplemental Coverage.  
If an employee wanted to know, for example, the procedure 
for filing a claim, he would look in only one place, and then 
file only one claim.  Purchasing the Supplemental Coverage 
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merely bestowed a higher level of benefits pursuant to the 
same terms. 
 Viewing the Basic Policies and Supplemental 
Coverage as two parts of a broader whole is consistent with 
ERISA’s policy goals.  One of the statute’s principal aims is 
to avoid subjecting regulated entities to conflicting sources of 
substantive law.  N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-57 
(1995).  Such uniform regulation “is impossible . . . if plans 
are subject to different legal obligations in different States.”  
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 
(2001).  Making different parts of a single, integrated plan 
subject to differing legal regimes could actually deter 
employers from offering such additional coverage in the first 
place.  Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010).   
 
 Accordingly, we hold that the Supplemental Coverage 
cannot be unbundled from the Basic Plans.  In so holding, we 
join every Court of Appeals to have considered whether to 
unbundle closely related components of an employer’s 
broader ERISA benefits plan and declined to do so.  For 
example, in Gross v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 734 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), the plaintiff’s employer paid all of its 
employees’ premiums for life and accidental death and 
dismemberment insurance, but employees paid all of their 
own premiums for optional long term disability coverage.  Id. 
at 4.  After the plaintiff’s insurance company denied her 
coverage under the long term disability policy, she brought 
numerous state law claims against the carrier responsible for 
the long term disability policy.  The district court held that 
her claims with respect to the long term disability policy were 
preempted and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
affirmed.  The Court of Appeals viewed the long term 
disability policy as part of a “comprehensive employee 
benefit plan” that the employer offered its employees.  Id. at 7 
(quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that the employer 
offered all three policies pursuant to the same group contract 
with its insurer, and the benefits, rules, exclusions, and claim 
procedures were covered by the same plan documents.  Id. at 
8.  It held that because a “‘plan’ under ERISA may embrace 
one or more policies,” there was “no justification for isolating 
the long-term disability policy from [the employer’s] 
insurance package.”  Id.; see also Sgro v. Danone Waters of 
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N. Am., Inc., 532 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2008) (“So long as 
[the employer] pays for some benefits, ERISA applies to the 
whole plan, even if employees pay entirely for other 
benefits.”); Postma v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 223 F.3d 
533, 538 (7th Cir. 2000) (“For purposes of determining 
whether a benefit plan is subject to ERISA, its various aspects 
ought not be unbundled.”); Gaylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 460, 463 (10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to sever 
optional insurance coverage that “was a feature of the Plan, 
notwithstanding the fact that the cost of such coverage had to 
be contributed by the employee”); Glass v. United of Omaha 
Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The 
Elect Life feature is part and parcel of the whole group 
insurance plan and thus ERISA governs it.”). 
 
 Because the Supplemental Coverage cannot be 
unbundled from the Basic Policies here, the regulatory safe 
harbor cannot save the plaintiffs’ state law claims.  See Gross, 
734 F.3d at 10 (“Our rejection of [the plaintiff’s] assumption 
that [the employer] provided multiple, independent plans is 
fatal to her safe harbor argument.”); accord Sgro, 532 F.3d at 
942-43; Gaylor, 112 F.3d at 463; Glass, 33 F.3d at 1345.  The 
safe harbor provides that “a group or group-type insurance 
program offered by an insurer to employees or members of an 
employee organization” is not considered an ERISA plan, but 
rather a non-ERISA “program” if the following requirements 
are met: 
 
(1) No contributions are made by an employer 
or employee organization; 
(2) Participation [in] the program is completely 
voluntary for employees or members; 
(3) The sole functions of the employer or 
employee organization with respect to the 
program are, without endorsing the program, 
to permit the insurer to publicize the 
program to employees or members, to 
collect premiums through payroll deductions 
or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the 
insurer; and 
(4) The employer or employee organization 
receives no consideration in the form of cash 
or otherwise in connection with the 
 13 
 
program, other than reasonable 
compensation, excluding any profit, for 
administrative services actually rendered in 
connection with payroll deductions or dues 
checkoffs.   
 
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j).  Group programs must meet all four 
criteria to be exempted from ERISA.  See Stuart v. UNUM 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(collecting authority).   
 
 It is undisputed that Qinetiq paid the premiums for the 
Basic Policies and that it automatically enrolled the plaintiffs 
in basic coverage merely because they were employees.  The 
plaintiffs thus fail to meet the first two of the four criteria that 
must all apply in order for the safe harbor to carve out a 
“program” from ERISA’s otherwise expansive “uniform 
regulatory regime.”  Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 
200, 208 (2004). 
 
IV. 
 
 Having concluded that ERISA governs the 
Supplemental Coverage, we must now examine whether the 
specific causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs are 
preempted by ERISA’s “expansive pre-emption provisions.”  
Id.  ERISA possesses “extraordinary pre-emptive power.”  
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987).  
Congress hoped that consolidating regulation and decision-
making with respect to covered plans in the federal sphere 
would promote uniform administration of benefit plans and 
avoid subjecting regulated entities to conflicting sources of 
substantive law.  Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 657.  Congress 
intended to “minimize the administrative and financial 
burden” imposed on regulated entities, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990), and to expand 
employers’ provision of benefits in light of the more 
“predictable set of liabilities,” Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002). 
 
 Two variants of ERISA preemption are relevant to this 
appeal.  The first is express preemption under ERISA § 
514(a).  ERISA’s express preemption provision provides that 
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ERISA’s regulatory structure “shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan [subject to ERISA].”  29 U.S.C. § 
1144(a).
5
  “Relate to” has always been given a broad, 
common-sense meaning, such that a state law “‘relates to’ an 
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it 
has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”  Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).  “State law” 
includes “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State 
action having the effect of law, of any State,” 29 U.S.C. § 
1144(c)(1), and is “not limited to state laws specifically 
designed to affect employee benefit plans,” Pilot Life Ins. Co. 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987) (quotation marks 
omitted).  In determining whether a claim “relates to” an 
ERISA plan, we must also consider “the objectives of the 
ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that 
Congress understood would survive” preemption.  Cal. Div. 
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997) (quotation marks omitted).  
State common law claims, including those raised here, 
routinely fall within the ambit of § 514.  See Ingersoll-Rand, 
498 U.S. at 140; Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65, 83 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
 
 Some of the plaintiffs’ claims also implicate conflict 
preemption.
6
  Congress intended for the causes of action and 
remedies available under ERISA § 502 to be the exclusive 
                                              
5
 The parties do not contend that either ERISA’s “savings 
clause,” § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), which 
exempts state laws that regulate insurance, banking, or 
securities, or its “deemer clause,” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 
1144(b)(2)(B), which makes clear that a state law that 
regulates insurance, banking, or securities cannot deem an 
employee benefit plan to be an insurance company, applies, 
and neither does. 
6
 The District Court also analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims under 
“complete preemption.”  App. 804-05.  Complete preemption 
is a “jurisdictional concept,” not a substantive concept 
governing which law is applicable, like express or conflict 
preemption.  In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 
(3d Cir. 1999).  There is no dispute over subject matter 
jurisdiction in this suit, which is proper. 
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vehicles for actions by ERISA plan participants asserting 
improper plan administration.  Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.  A 
claim is conflict preempted by § 502 when it “duplicates, 
supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement 
remedy.”  Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209.  Section 502 bars 
any claim that “provides a form of ultimate relief in a judicial 
forum that add[s] to the judicial remedies provided by 
ERISA.”  Barber v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 383 F.3d 
134, 140 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 The plaintiffs’ claims fall into three broad categories:  
(1) common law fraud, misrepresentation, and violation of the 
New Jersey CFA; (2) breach of contract, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of 
fiduciary duty; and (3) punitive damages.
7
  In the 
circumstances presented here, ERISA preempts all three sets 
of claims.
8
 
 
A. 
 
 The plaintiffs’ claims for common law fraud, 
misrepresentation, and violation of the New Jersey CFA 
relate to the plaintiffs’ ERISA plan because they are premised 
on the existence of the plan and require interpreting the plan’s 
terms.  In order to state a claim for common law fraud, a 
plaintiff must claim that the defendant made a material 
misrepresentation.  See Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 876 
A.2d 253, 260 (N.J. 2005).  The contours of a CFA violation 
are similar in that the plaintiff must claim that the defendant 
engaged in unlawful conduct that includes employing a 
                                              
7
 The plaintiffs’ complaint also alleged violations of the New 
Jersey TCCWNA, which prohibits misleading contracts, and 
violations of statutory consumer fraud laws of every state 
(except Ohio) and the District of Columbia.  App. 49, 55-61.  
The plaintiffs do not challenge the dismissal of these claims 
on appeal.  Therefore, they have waived any arguments they 
had related to these laws.  See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 
144, 152 n.10 (3d Cir. 2012). 
8
 Because we hold that ERISA preempts all of the plaintiffs’ 
claims, we need not reach the District Court’s alternative 
conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claims were also preempted by 
the DBA. 
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misrepresentation or omitting a material fact.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 56:8-2; see also Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 
85 A.3d 947, 960 (N.J. 2014).  The plaintiffs’ contention here 
is that the defendants “deliberately concealed material facts 
regarding the [Supplemental Coverage], including but not 
limited to:  (1) the [Supplemental Coverage] did not provide 
disability benefits in the event Plaintiffs and members of the 
Class were injured in Iraq and/or Afghanistan; [and] (2) 
Defendant Prudential would deny the disability claims of 
Plaintiffs and members of the Class based upon the war 
exclusion in the [Supplemental Coverage].”  App. 21 
(Complaint ¶ 35).   
 
 Resolving these allegations would require a court to 
assess the defendants’ “representations in light of the 
plaintiffs’ benefits and rights under the plans.”  Iola, 700 F.3d 
at 84.  When the plaintiffs decided to pay additional 
premiums to enroll in the Supplemental Coverage, they 
(rightly or wrongly) thought that the policies would cover 
them in a certain set of circumstances.  The war exclusions 
reduced the set of covered circumstances.  Determining 
whether the coverage was of negligible value involves 
determining the set of covered circumstances, which involves 
reference to the war exclusion, which is part of the policy.  
“This type of analysis — concerning the accuracy of 
statements . . . to plan participants in the course of 
administering the plans — sits within the heartland of 
ERISA,” and ERISA expressly preempts these claims.  Id.  
Courts have routinely held that claims like these that sound in 
fraud are expressly preempted by ERISA.  See Pilot Life, 481 
U.S. at 47 (fraudulent inducement claim preempted by 
ERISA); Iola, 700 F.3d at 84 (claims for misrepresentations 
about commissions and size of reserve fund preempted 
because they were premised on the existence of the ERISA 
plans); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 923 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (misrepresentation claim premised on a deceptive 
statement in a letter regarding plan amendments preempted 
because the letter related to the ERISA plan).
9
 
                                              
9
 The same is true of the CFA claim.  Other Courts of 
Appeals have held that similar consumer fraud statutes are 
also expressly preempted by ERISA.  See, e.g., Paneccasio v. 
Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) 
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 The plaintiffs attempt to circumvent this barrier by 
arguing that their claims relate to an unstated policy or 
practice of automatically denying claims based on the war 
exclusion clauses even in situations where the exclusions 
should not apply.  However, this is still a claim that is about 
the benefits owed and is expressly preempted by ERISA.  The 
plaintiffs ignore that proving this claim will require reference 
to plan documents to determine what each policy covers, and 
then examining Prudential’s claims administration processing 
and procedures in light of the plan’s contours.  In essence, 
they allege that Prudential was consistently making improper 
benefit determinations.  Where liability is predicated on a 
plan’s administration, ERISA preempts state law claims 
because “a benefit determination is part and parcel of the 
ordinary fiduciary responsibilities connected to the 
administration of a plan.”  Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 219; see 
also Kollman v. Hewitt Assocs., LLC, 487 F.3d 139, 150 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (determining whether erroneous benefits 
calculation was malpractice would require consulting what 
benefits the plan provides and was thus preempted). 
 
B. 
 
 The plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
breach of fiduciary duty
10
 are likewise expressly preempted 
because they also relate to the administration of the ERISA 
                                                                                                     
(claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act 
concerning improper denial of benefits related to the plan and 
was preempted); Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889, 891 
(7th Cir. 1994) (application of Illinois’s consumer protection 
law to representations made in documents regulated by 
ERISA plan was preempted).  A number of district courts in 
this Circuit have also held that the New Jersey CFA is 
expressly preempted.  See, e.g., Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of N.J., 568 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D.N.J. 2008). 
10
 The plaintiffs brought their claim for state law breach of 
fiduciary duty in their amended complaint.  See App. 496.  
The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to 
amend the complaint as futile because this breach of fiduciary 
duty claim — the only claim that the plaintiffs sought to add 
— was preempted.  For the reasons stated herein, we agree. 
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plans.  To prove breach of contract, a contract must have 
existed.  See Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union 
No. 27, AFL-CIO v. E.P. Donnelly, Inc., 737 F.3d 879, 900 
(3d Cir. 2013).  The plaintiffs specifically allege that the 
contracts that the defendants purportedly breached were the 
insurance policies they purchased.  See App. 50 (Complaint ¶ 
171).  The defendants owed the plaintiffs fiduciary duties 
only on account of these agreements.   
 
 These claims again relate to the improper denial of 
benefits because of the war exclusion clause.  Claims 
involving denial of benefits or improper processing of 
benefits require interpreting what benefits are due under the 
plan.  Because these claims explicitly require reference to the 
plan and what it covers, they are expressly preempted.  See 
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48 (breach of contract claim 
expressly preempted); accord Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 
631, 635 (3d Cir. 1989).  
 
C. 
 
 The plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is conflict 
preempted by ERISA’s exclusive civil remedy scheme in § 
502(a).  As we have previously held, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in “Aetna Health confirms that conflict preemption 
applies to any ‘state cause of action that provides an 
alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil 
enforcement mechanism’ because such a cause of action 
‘conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA 
mechanism exclusive.’”  Barber, 383 F.3d at 140 (quoting 
Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 214 n.4).  Congress did not make 
punitive damages available under ERISA.  “The policy 
choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the 
exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be 
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and 
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that 
Congress rejected in ERISA.”  Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.  
Because Congress did not choose to include punitive damages 
as an available remedy, ERISA § 502(a) conflicts with and 
preempts the plaintiffs’ state law claim.  See Pane, 868 F.2d 
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at 635 & n.2 (ERISA preempted claim for punitive 
damages).
11
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint for 
failure to state a claim and denying leave to file an amended 
complaint. 
 
                                              
11
 The plaintiffs also argue that their state law claims are not 
preempted because another remedy they seek — return of 
premiums — is not available under ERISA.  This argument 
conflates potential remedies with causes of action, and is also 
irrelevant.  Any state laws that supplement the remedies 
available under ERISA conflict with the “clear congressional 
intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive.”  Aetna Health, 
542 U.S at 209.  Furthermore, this kind of relief may well be 
available under ERISA § 502(a).  The Supreme Court 
recently held, albeit in a different context, that “other 
appropriate equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3) may consist of 
“monetary compensation for a loss resulting from a trustee’s 
breach of duty, or to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment.”  
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Several Courts of Appeals have 
held that the remedy of return of premiums is available under 
ERISA § 502(a).  See, e.g., Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, 
Inc., 722 F.3d 869, 882 (7th Cir. 2013); McCravy v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176, 182-83 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 
2007); Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of New York, 392 
F.3d 401, 407 (10th Cir. 2004). 
